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ABSTRACT 
This article shed light on the shadow state, investigating who belongs to it, their interests, and their 
relation to the water sector. This is important because Jordan is known to be among the most water 
scarce countries in the world and some water professionals see in the shadow state an obstacle to 
implementing successful water policies, resulting to be one of the main reasons behind inefficiencies 
in the water sector in the country. Furthermore, an in-depth investigation of the relation between the 
shadow state and the water sector is needed. This article makes a contribution by analysing the 
current challenges posed by the shadow state to efficient operations of the water institutions as well 
as wider government, and the difficulties they encounter in responding with reforms in Jordan. This 
analysis will serve policy makers and water professionals to better understand how to navigate the 
complex Jordanian water sector. This is particularly important nowadays in order to ensure socio-
economic and political stability of Jordan in the aftermath of the so-called “Arab Spring”.  
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1. Introduction 
Jordan is among the most water scarce countries in the world. However, the literature on water 
resources conducted by Jordanian academics has taken mainly an engineering and geological 
approach rather than political and social sciences ones. This article investigates the challenges in 
implementation of water policies in Jordan, focusing on the role of the shadow state in the politics of 
water in the country, and more specifically in the cases of illegal wells and illegal uses, and in the 
unsustainable agricultural water uses, which helps at better understanding the politics of water in the 
country. In fact, amongst government ministers, officials, political scientists, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), donors, academics, and journalists there is virtual unanimity dating back to 
the 1990s in seeing in the shadow state an obstacle to implementing successful water policies (Yorke, 
2013; 2016), resulting to be one of the main reasons behind inefficiencies in the water sector in the 
country. Nevertheless, there has only been some initial research by Yorke (2013; 2016), Greenwood 
(2014), and Hussein (2016) on the topic. While this article focuses on Jordan, its findings can be 
helpful also to water professionals, scholars, and policy makers in other countries that are facing 
similar challenges; for instance, Lebanon is also considered a water scarce country, and illegal wells 
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and unsustainable agricultural water uses are linked to power dynamics and to the Lebanese shadow 
state, reflecting to some extent the Jordanian situation discusses in this article.   
 This analysis will serve policy makers and water professionals to better understand how to 
navigate the complex Jordanian water sector. The data deployed in this article comes primarily from 
reports, semi-structured interviews, and documentation collected during fieldwork in Jordan between 
July 2011 and December 2014, as well as secondary literature and material published online.  This 
article first unpacks the Jordanian shadow state; second, it investigates the role of the shadow states 
in two case studies: illegal wells and uses, and in the unsustainable agricultural water use.  
A central concept of this article is the shadow state; within a shadow state, authority belongs 
to an individual or group of individuals; it is a neo-patrimonial regime that can also have a façade of 
laws, procedures, and governmental institutions. The official ruler maintains the support of key 
actors, who are linked to him through tribal or regional affiliation, and through privileged access to 
economic assets. 
Concerning the water resources of Jordan, according to the 2014 water budget of the Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation (MWI), the total water resources in Jordan in 2013 were 864 Million Cubic 
Meters (MCM) per year (MWI, 2014: 20). Also the total safe yield of the groundwater basins in 
Jordan is estimated at about 300 MCM per year, while the total surface water resources from the 
Yarmouk, Jordan, and Zarqa Rivers in Jordan is 563 MCM per year, including treated wastewater. 
However, in 2010 groundwater represented the main source of water supply, with a total of 
approximately 54% of the total water supply, meaning over 500 MCM; surface water supply 
represented only 33%, meaning 286 MCM; while treated wastewater accounts for about 13% of the 
total water supply, meaning 117 MCM. While surface water represents a higher proportion of water 
resources, at around two thirds of the total water resources in Jordan, in practice two of the three 
major rivers, the Jordan and Yarmouk, are transboundary, and therefore Jordan is bound in their 
usage by bilateral agreements. Therefore, groundwater resources are the most important sources of 
water supply, and these are currently over-exploited (ibid.). Concerning water uses per sector, in 
2015 agriculture used 51%, domestic uses represented 45%, and the industrial sector 4%. Finally, 
non-revenue water, which includes both illegal connections and uses, such as wells, as well as 
leakages and loss due to network system, is estimated by 52% for 2015 (MWI, 2015).1  
 
                                                             
1 Moreover, increasing droughts are negatively impacting the water sector in Jordan, as confirmed by recent studies 
(Mohammad et al., 2018). Recent research showed that the Jordanian government has been exploring several solutions to 
increase the water supply in the country in the past decades. This has included building new dams, the Disi Canal project 
completed in 2013, supporting the construction of the Red Sea – Dead Sea Canal, and increasing transboundary cooperation 
efforts (Hussein, 2017abc; 2018, Hussein and Grandi, 2015; 2017). 
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2. What is a shadow state? Unpacking the Jordanian shadow actors  
Since the establishment of the kingdom in 1946, Jordanian politics has evolved and thus also the 
shape of informal structures, now in some publications called shadow state. The literature on 
informal structures has matured to reflect changes in their form as they occurred. These structures in 
one form or another date back to Jordan’s creation. For more than four decades, academics that have 
traced their workings and have analysed their evolving heterogeneity. As the nature of patronage 
changed to reflect the evolving political compact between Throne and people, so Jordanian subjects 
from different walks have enjoyed access to benefits and privileges, which they subsequently wished 
to protect. Heterogeneity expanded and altered over time. Hence, the shadow state is directly related 
to the historical evolution of the organisation of power on which the Hashemite rule is based. Key 
dates in the changing shape of the shadow state and its participants benefitting from state largesse 
and or aggrandisement in influence are – 1950s, 1970s, late 1980s, and 2011. The political-economic 
context at these times helps understanding initiatives by the monarchy and how the benefits and 
privileges were extended and to whom, and with what results. In a nutshell, today’s shadow state in 
Jordan has individual actors, ever coalescing in a range of different temporary groups around a 
variety of issues depending on specific vested interests (Tripp, 2002: 4-5, Springborg, 2007: 3-4; 
Yorke, 2013, 2016; Keulertz, 2013; Hussein, 2016).  
Within a shadow state, authority belongs to an individual or group of individuals; it is a neo-
patrimonial regime that can also have a façade of laws, procedures, and governmental institutions. 
The official ruler maintains the support of key actors, who are linked to him through tribal or regional 
affiliation, and through privileged access to economic assets. For Glass, “the great majority of the 
Levant’s people still look to traditional community and sectarian leaders for protection, favours, 
money and jobs. Loyalty to family, village, tribe and sect has always been stronger than ideology. 
Ideology comes and goes out of fashion. Loyalty does not” (Glass, 1990: 3-4). Being linked to the 
ruler, these actors become very influential in the shaping of national water policies, often more than 
the official institutions (Keulertz, 2013: 265-267, Yorke, 2013: 58-60, Tomaira, 2008: 213, 
Greenwood, 2014: 153, Zeitoun et al., 2012: 59).  
In Jordan there are official divisions of power between three branches, and a rational 
institutional legal system. However, Yorke (2013) noted that in practice the power resides in the 
king, who enjoys broad powers over the Parliament and the government - and in the shadow state 
(Yorke, 2013: 58-59, Oudat and Alshboul, 2010: 65). The individuals of the shadow state, in 
practice, have privileged access to resources and are influential in shaping policies and in resisting 
change. They support the official ruler and they participate in maintaining the status quo and their 
privileged position. Nevertheless, today Jordan is having difficulty in following through on 
integrated planning and water policy in the national interest on account of the entrenched position of 
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anti-reformists with vested interests in the status quo. This emerged in relation to the fate of the 2005 
National Agenda. Preferred policies of the monarchy and those of some shadow state members are 
not the same (Muasher, 2011; Yorke, 1988, 1990, 2013; Greenwood, 2003).  
As mentioned above, the shadow actors are not fixed over time, they are not static, but 
subject to change over time. This emerges in the history of Jordan looking at some social groups , 
which passed from being initially completely marginalised to becoming fully part of Jordanian 
society. For instance, the case of Jordanian Bedouins, whose more influential members are influential 
shadow actors since the 1980s, while Jordanian Bedouins became legally full citizens and not 
discriminated by law only in 1976 (Massad, 2001: 52).  
The shadow actors used to be identified with the East Banker tribes – tribes with origins from 
today’s Jordan -, seeing them in a dualistic way opposed to Jordanians of Palestinian origins. For 
Hübschen (2011), Jordanian tribes are those who really rule the kingdom, comprising the shadow 
actors and political elite of the country, versus the Jordanian of Palestinian origins, seen as 
discriminated and marginalised within the social and political society (Hübschen, 2011: 118-123). 
For Gao (in Sindic et al., 2014: 50-65), power relies in the tribes for historical reasons, and this 
emerges in the electoral system, in the wasta (personal networks) system, and in civil rights 
privileges granted to East Bankers. According to Gao (ibid.), civil rights privileges include the 
process for obtaining the Jordanian citizenship for children of parents with one Jordanian parent and 
one non-Jordanian parent. For Oudat and Alshboul, informal tribal networks substitute in practice the 
formal institutions and authority (Oudat and Alshboul, 2010: 90). Other scholars used to describe the 
tribes as the backbone of the monarchy and loyal to the kingdom since its establishment (Alon, 2005: 
213), and benefiting from and comprising the wasta system and the shadow actors (Loewe et al., 
2008: 29-30, Al-Ramahi, 2008: 38-40, Wilson, 1990: 57). As noted by Alon (2007), since Black 
September2, media and scholars seem to have preferred an oversimplification of Jordanian society, 
where Bedouins and tribes are described as the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy, and 
Palestinians as the marginalised and disloyal category (Alon, 2007: 1). However, this article builds 
on Yorke (1988, 1990, 2013, 2016), Greenwood (2003), Muasher (2011) in arguing that not all tribes 
supported the Hashemites at the establishment of the Emirate in early 1920s, not all tribes have equal 
weight and influence, and not all members of the tribes are shadow actors. Therefore, this article 
shows how Jordan’s classical tribes are not a monolith and differ in influence.  
In fact, in Jordan there are several examples of Qabilas, or confederation of tribes: Bani 
Hamida and Howeitat in the South, Bani Sakher and Al Odwan in the middle, and Bani Hasan and 
                                                             
2 Black September refers to the Jordanian Civil War, which started in September 1970 and ended in the summer 
1971. The war was fought between Jordanians and the Palestine Liberation Organisation of Arafat, which aimed 
at taking the power in Jordan 
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Bani Khalid in the north. Within each Qabila, there are the Ashaer, which are usually known as 
tribes. Interviews showed that within a tribe, only those economically or politically important are 
influential and can resist change and shape policies, and are to be seen as shadow actors. Instead, 
those who even if members of an important family are marginalised and poor, will be treated as 
normal citizens with no wasta and subject to the laws of the state (interview 2 and 41).  
Moreover, the Bedouins, who are thought to be the most truly representative group of 
Jordanian history and culture, have been discriminated by law by the state and were subject 
to the Law of Supervising the Bedouins – also known as Bedouin Control Law - since 1929 
until 1976 (Massad, 2001: 52) (interview 2 with academic). In addition, also within the most 
influential Jordanian tribes, there are marginalised people who are not influential and not 
part of the shadow states, for instance the youth activists of the Hirak  movement3, who are 
mainly from rural, marginalised, and poor tribal communities (Yom, 2014: 229) (interview 2 
with academic). As discussed above, the shadow state is a heterogeneous rather than a 
monolithic group, which comprises different individuals. The shadow actors can be: 
managers and important figures from the public sector agencies, including the military, 
intelligence services, and ministries; elites from the commercial and private sector; and 
sheikhs, tribal leaders, and influential people within tribes. Therefore, the division between 
East Bankers and Jordanians of Palestinian origins is not relevant as managers and important 
figures from the public sector, who are part of the shadow states, are also of Palestinian 
origin. This is the case with the following individuals from Palestinian families, who reached 
influential positions: Muhammad Rasul Al Kilani, the former General Director of 
Intelligence, Mudar Badran, General Director of the Intelligence, Samir and Zaid Rifai, both 
former Prime Ministers of Jordan, Sulayman Nabulsi, former Prime Minister in the 1950s, 
Sabih Taher al-Masri, Chairman of the Arab Bank, Founder and Chairman of Arab Supply 
and Trading Company (ASTRA), Chairman of Palestine Telecommunication Company 
(PLC), and Chairman of ZARA Investment Holding Company Limited (he also owned the 
agribusiness in Disi area) (interview 2 with academics)(Keulertz, 2013: 268-269; Massad, 
2011: 202).  
                                                             
3 Hirak, which literally means movement, is a Jordanian Youth Movement started during the Arab Spring or 
upraising and most of its members are of East Banker origins from rural and marginalized areas, like Tafilah. 
They strongly oppose corruption in the public sector and in politics, and they called for regime change and 
accused the highest political authorities of corruption 
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When it comes to religion, it is not really clear what role if any it has among shadow 
actors. In an interview, a spoke person of the Muslim Brotherhood party explained in 2013 
that it is problematic for the water sector to have Christian ministers of the MWI. For him, 
having a current and previous ministers of the MWI of Christian beliefs explains: the lack of 
an agreement (the interview took place in 2014 before the agreement over the Disi aquifer 
system) with the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia on the Disi; and the violations of the Islamic 
state of Syria of the agreement with Jordan signed in 1987 on the Yarmouk River (interview 
29). However, while the ministry was established in the spring of 1988, ever since about 
twenty ministers of the MWI took office and only four of them were Christians. Samir 
Kawar was appointed because of his membership in a parliament block; Bassam Qaqish, to 
award him for his distinguished service in the military; and two, Haddadin and Hazim 
Nasser, twice because of their technical competence (interview 52 with a former minister of 
the MWI).  
 Also, in order to investigate the influence of tribes and Palestinians upon the water sector in 
Jordan, it is necessary not to see them as fixed categories. Jordanians of Palestinian origins 
represented in the government, parliament, and among shadow actors, are from influential families 
living in Amman, for instance Rifai and Al Masri, and they support the political-economic system 
and the status quo (interview 23 with an expert in political affairs from the parliament; interview 2 
with an academic from the University of Jordan). Poor and not influential families with the same 
origins, marginalised individuals within the influential families, or those against the status quo like 
members of opposition parties like the Muslim Brotherhood, cannot influence or resist change, 
policies, and decisions in the water sector (the Muslim Brotherhood has a voice in the political arena, 
but it is not influential and cannot shape or resist policies) (ibid.).  
 
3. How the shadow state works 
3.1 The shadow actors and illegal wells and illegal uses 
The first case study to analyse the role of the shadow actors in the Jordanian water sector is by 
looking at illegal wells and illegal uses, both at how it is talked about and at how it is acted upon in 
order to reduce its amount. In August 2013, the new minister of the MWI Hazim Al Nasser started a 
campaign against illegal wells. Before 2013, media focused on water leakages and physical losses 
rather than on illegal wells and uses; and it did so in relation to projects of the Japanese International 
cooperation Agency (JICA), US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the German 
Development Agency (GIZ) relating to improving the pipeline system, or through improvements on 
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the metering system (Namrouqa, 2013a, Luck, 2008, Ghazal, 2010b, Ghazal, 2010a). Before 2013, 
illegal water uses and thefts were mentioned in articles reporting declarations of Miyahuna, the 
Amman Water Company, and their difficulties in collecting revenues and their losses due to illegal 
connections (Namrouqa, 2008, Namrouqa, 2010). Before 2013, the MWI discussed illegal water uses 
in the MWI water strategies in 1997, which led to the groundwater by law 85 in 2002, in the 2009 
national water strategy “Water for Life”, in the MWI Highland Water Forum from 2010, and the 
Royal Water Committee; nevertheless, all these initiatives had limited success. USAID pushed for 
the MWI to tackle the issue of illegal wells as a priority, as emerges in the following USAID/Audit 
report: 
 
Mission officials noted that during negotiations over the draft list of conditions precedent, 
Government of Jordan officials requested that mission staff remove one condition. It required 
the Government of Jordan to shut down 50 illegal wells. Although closing the illegal wells 
would increase Jordan’s water sustainability by decreasing nonrevenue water, Government of 
Jordan officials could not achieve the condition precedent because of political pressure from 
influential agribusiness owners (USAID, 2011: 5-6). 
  
Interviews with personnel from the international organisations and donors’ agencies showed 
that illegal wells and illegal uses are seen as a major obstacle for an efficient water sector, and they 
also identif ied in certain shadow actors, like big farmers and tribal leaders, the reasons why the 
government did not act against the violations (interviews 58 and 59). This shows that before 2013 
donors, USAID in particular, were pushing the government of Jordan to close the illegal wells. 
However, this was not possible due to political pressure from within the shadow states, as 
emphasised by the USAID reports, which call it “influential agribusiness owners,” and by interviews 
with donors and United Nations (UN) agencies in Jordan (USAID, 2011: 5-6) ( interviews 45, 58, 
and 59). In particular, it emerged that while the MWI saw the illegal connections and uses as an issue 
to be tackled, the MWI did not successfully push for this until 2013. The year 2013 can be seen as a 
milestone for more effective water demand management due to the appointment of the experience 
Minister Hazem Al Nasser, as well as for the historical context in which is situated: as a reaction to 
the so-called “Arab Spring”, in Jordan King Abdullah’s 2012/2013 political initiative was launched 
as a promise of political transition, resulting also in greater appreciation from the top of the strategic 
importance of water to the kingdom’s stability.  
Since August 2013 the so-called “illegal wells campaign” was launched by Hazem Al 
Nasser, minister of the MWI. However, this campaign is not a new one, but rather a new focus on the 
issue of so-called illegal wells, in conformity to the 2002 groundwater by-law. When launching it, the 
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minister stated that “this is a high-level decision, which calls for respecting the law and achieving 
justice… nobody has the right to claim that they are above the law, whatever their… political, tribal 
or social background may be,” adding that the objective is to close all illegal wells in the country 
(Namrouqa, 2013d). This willingness to implement the legislation, according to high officials of the 
MWI and to academics, started in 2013 because of the new emphasis and energy of this new 
minister, and also as a result of the impact of the so-called “Arab Spring”, which led to the 
production of the king’s initiative in 2012/2013 (interviews 7 and 42). Penalties for illegal wells 
became much higher, and now ministries of interior and police are supporting the campaign, 
cooperating with the MWI (interview 18 and 42). This is important because in the past the MWI 
personnel was often not able to implement the legislation because they were threatened by farmers, 
even with guns (Wardam, 2004: 79) (interviews 7, 11, 42): 
 
Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) employees in the northern Governorate of Ajloun were 
recently attacked after installing devices to prevent water theft, according to authorities. 
[They] threw stones at the WAJ workers and damaged newly installed water devices, an 
official at the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, who asked to remain unnamed, said yesterday 
(Namrouqa, 2009).  
 
The government also approved regulations to make working permits, electricity connection, 
loans, etc. always conditional on a clearance from the MWI (by the Water Authority of Jordan – 
WAJ); therefore if a person has an illegal well, all his economic and professional activities will be 
suspended (Namrouqa, 2014a). For this campaign the MWI also involved the religious authorities, 
who issued a religious edict, known as fatwa, against water theft and violations to the water networks 
(Namrouqa, 2013c). 
Since the campaign, the issue became ‘talkable’, and this emerges from extensive media 
coverage. For instance, Namrouqa – a journalist of the Jordan Times that covers water issues -, who 
never particularly focused on this issue before the campaign, in 2014 uncritically reports the new 
voice of the MWI, with an article titled “70% of water loss in Jordan blamed on theft, illegal usage - 
ministry” (Namrouqa, 2014a). Also the newspapers in Arabic have been following, reporting on, and 
reproducing this issue since 2013. In Al Rai, for instance, several articles appeared emphasising the 
successes of this campaign, while Wardam in Ad-Dustour has underlined the necessity of continuing 
with this campaign (Zakarneh, 2015, Wardam, 2013). 
However, while in theory the campaign aims at closing the illegal wells, which are mainly 
owned by influential actors such as large farmers in Azraq or powerful individual around Amman, in 
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practice the government is implementing the campaign mainly towards non-influential and non-
powerful actors. In fact, interviews revealed that, after a closer look at how the campaign is being 
implemented in relation to the shadow actors, it emerges that the targets of the campaign, in practice, 
are not the influential actors, but rather, once again, the poor and marginalised individuals (interview 
11). This emerges, for instance, from the operations in Lubban, a village south of Amman, mainly 
populated by the influential Fayez tribe (interview 26). The WAJ employees tried to close a number 
of illegal wells there, but they were denied access and had to negotiate and agree with the influential 
people within the tribe on which wells to close (Namrouqa, 2014c). According to a Jordanian 
academic, the MWI accepted to close only eight illegal wells, which already were non-operational 
(interview 11). In this way, the shadow actors were not impacted, while the MWI saved its face in 
front of the media, which reported the governmental version. And so did Namrouqa of the Jordan 
Times (Namrouqa, 2014c). Also, illegal wells in the Disi area of influential people and illegal wells 
of the economic-political elite in the Azraq area have not been closed, yet (interviews 11 and 55). 
Nevertheless, according to data provided by the MWI, 562 illegal wells have been closed in 2014 
(MWI, 2015). 
Interestingly, the blame tends to be on the domestic individual users rather than on the 
agricultural users (interview 45). In interviews with senior officials of the MWI, it emerged that the 
main problem related to the illegal wells is water stolen for selling and for domestic uses, de-
emphasising the agricultural aspect (interview 18 and 42). Given that the highest number of illegal 
wells for agricultural uses is in the Azraq area, it is indeed surprising that it was overlooked 
(interview 15).4 Overlooking the unlicensed wells in the agricultural sector seems to be an attempt to 
protect the shadow actors, meaning the farmers’ lobby, the influential agribusiness men, and the big 
interests that the sector hides. Elements of the shadow states, influential people from Amman that 
have invested in the 1980s and 1990s in big farms in Azraq area, have high interests in maintaining 
the status quo and current uses in the agricultural sector in Azraq governorate.  
According to donors, the influence of the shadow actors also emerges in the clause added by 
the MWI to save some illegal wells (interview 45). The clause is an exemption for illegal wells that 
provide socio-economic benefits. This exemption may be a legal way to protect and save shadow 
actors as it is a legal way to legalise some non-licensed wells. A study has been recently concluded 
by ISSP and the MWI to verify which wells are bringing economic and socio benefits to households, 
or if the owner are simply business-men from Amman or elsewhere (ISSP, 2014). The first findings 
of this same study also confirm that most of the illegal wells are in the Highlands: in north-western 
                                                             
4 A current study of a donor organisation found that Mafraq is the leading basin in the total estimated abstracted groundwater 
for agricultural use followed by Azraq, and results also show that 73% of the total abstracted groundwater was used by large 
farmers. By large farmers this article refers to 382 farms with greater than 20 ha. A study is being published by USAID-ISSP 
this year on this issue (interview 45). 
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Badia, in the areas of Mafraq and of Azraq (ibid.). The owners are mainly Jordanian businessmen 
part of the political-economic elite (interview 45). Large farms are mainly in Mafraq, but they can be 
also found in Azraq. This is due to the low depth of the groundwater in Azraq (interview 42) (ISSP, 
2014). The MWI has attempted to improve water demand management in these areas through the 
Highland Water Forum, but with limited success.  
As further discussed below, policies not favouring shadow actors tend not to be 
implemented. This appears, for instance, from: the removal of the clause in the USAID report 
discussed above; interviews with donors and UN agencies; the MWI blaming the domestic illegal 
uses rather than the illegal wells in the agricultural sector; the clause to save certain illegal wells from 
this campaign; and the lack of enforcement of the 2002 groundwater by law 85 until 2013. The 
government was promoting the interests of the shadow actors by framing this issue of non-revenue 
water as a technical issue of leakages and losses. This was to maintain the status quo of both legal 
and illegal uses, which benefited the shadow actors. In a statement of the previous minister of the 
MWI Jamani, he underlines how the focus for solving the water scarcity problem in Jordan should 
not be on reducing water loss: “highlighting Jordan's critical water situation, Jamani noted that even 
with improving water efficiency, reducing water loss and wisely managing every drop of water, the 
country will still suffer from a water deficit” (Namrouqa, 2012). 
The last aspect that needs to be examined within this campaign is the concept of illegality. 
This concept is an issue because it is subjective, as the more powerful actors can decide whom to 
include or exclude from the legality sphere. This campaign is supposedly against people who have 
illegal wells. As emerged from an interview with a UN official, it seems that the concept of legality 
of wells is rather controversial: if you have good connections and personal networks (wasta), then 
you will easily manage to get your application for a permit approved, and therefore legalise your 
well. If you are a marginalised individual with no influence or no connections then your well will be 
an illegal one, even if it is acknowledged by the MWI-WAJ and if you have been paying for its usage 
(interview 55, 58, and 67).  
The blame is on those that do not have a license, most of the time those are the marginalised 
people with no connections and influence to manage to have a license, and who use water mainly for 
domestic use. In addition, the blame is on those, who use the illegal wells for domestic use rather 
than for agricultural purposes. The members of the shadow states belong mainly to the latter group. 
In this way, the legality concept hides the issues of sustainable use of water in agriculture, discussed 
in the next section. Ad hoc clauses to save some illegal wells have also been included to transform 
illegal wells into legal wells, attempting to save some shadow actors that did not obtain a license. 
Overall, the discourse is protecting once again the shadow actors, their interests, and the current 
water uses.  
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3.2 The shadow actors and the unsustainable agricultural water use 
The second case study to analyse the role of the shadow actors in the Jordanian water sector is by 
looking at the inefficient water management, especially in the agricultural sector, which consumes 
almost 60% of the water resources in Jordan (MWI, 2009). In the interviews with donors and 
international organisations, the unsustainable agricultural water use emerged strongly and 
overwhelmingly as an important cause of water scarcity in the country, especially concerning the 
irreversible damage to groundwater aquifers in the Highlands. This section examines the following 
two aspects: inefficiency in irrigation, and the export of agricultural products – unfolding the role that 
the shadow actors have in both aspects. It argues that the unsustainable water use in agriculture, 
which is emphasised by donors and international organisations and by a minority of academics, in 
practice is overlooked by the MWI and most governmental officials.  
According to agricultural water use as a reason for water scarcity, the agricultural sector is 
economically not efficient, from an economic water use perspective, meaning dollars per drop or jobs 
per drop. This is because it uses around 60% of the water resources in Jordan, but it contributes with 
only 3% to the national gross domestic product (GDP) and it employs less than 4% of the national 
labour force – which is mainly non-Jodanian (IFC, 2012: 5, Castejon, 2011: 227). This reason for 
water scarcity emerges in reports of and interviews with donors and international organisations. In 
the interviews with donors and UN agencies, the interviewees underlined and emphasised the 
economic inefficiency of the irrigation techniques, technologies, and type of crops used by farmers, 
the latter often water intense (interviews 45 and 58) (IFC, 2012: 5, ISSP, 2012b: iii). This 
inefficiency in water use is also motivated by the low economic incentives set by the high subsidies 
for water for the agricultural sector. In Jordan, as emerges from Table 1, farmers in the Highlands are 
those paying the least for water, followed by farmers in the Jordan Valley, industries, and those using 
it for domestic use paying the highest amount. If the latter run out of water and decide to buy water 
from private tankers, the price in Amman is 25 Jordanian Dinars (JD) for six cubic meters, which is 
about four JD per CM. This is striking as agriculture in the Highlands over-exploits groundwater 
resources (Hussein, 2016: Chapter 5), and is far less efficient than agriculture in the Jordan Valley, 
where water in agriculture is used more efficiently (Mustafa, 2016). Despite agriculture in the 
Highlands uses two thirds of the total water used in Jordan by the agricultural sector, it accounts for 
only 29% of the national agricultural production (FAO, 2009: 240-242, ISSP, 2012b: 14). Overall, 
donors and international organisations argue that while it is not economically efficient, this sector 
makes an important contribution to the rural development of the country, and therefore agriculture 
comprises “vital socioeconomic activities in the country” (Barham, 2012: 4). For this reason, for 
them agriculture should be reformed and made more efficient.  
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Table 1 Table 1: Water tariffs in Jordan 
Who  Where Sector  % of the 
total 
amount 
used in 
Jordan 
Type of water Water tariff (JD per CM) 
WAJ Jordan 
(mainly 
Highlands), 
excluded the 
Jordan Valley  
Agricultural 40%  Groundwater zero for 150,000 CM/ year; 
0.005 from 150,001 CM/ year 
until 200,000 CM/ year; 
0.60 for more than 200,000 
CM/ year. 
JVA Jordan Valley  Agricultural 20% Surface water 0.012 
WAJ Jordan Industrial  5% Groundwater  0.250 if pumped from private 
wells; 
1,800 within Qualifying 
Industrial Zones and for the 
Potash Industry 
WAJ Jordan Domestic 35% Mainly 
groundwater 
Based on rate block system, in 
average 0,480 
Source: author’s presentation of data from FoEME (Saif and Omet, 2005: 26) 
 
Reports, articles, and interviews, showed that the unsustainable water use in agriculture, 
which is emphasised by donors and international organisations and by a minority of academics, in 
practice has seen the MWI doing efforts but with limited capacity and resources, resulting to be 
unsuccessful also due to lack of cross sector collaboration and of political reforms. It is reproduced 
by critical academics not aligned with the governmental positions, whose thoughts coincide with the 
donors and international organisations positions. For instance, Barham, from the University of Jordan 
highlights how irrigation in the Highlands is “problematic,” and that “despite the permanent 
discussions of allocate water inter and intra sectoral, [in practice the amount of] water for agriculture 
[…] remained unchanged” (Barham, 2012: 4). For Barham, this is due to the fact that “the state is not 
in the position to activate laws against tribe leaders [and] investors in this area [which] consist of 
rentier-elite, high ranking state employees, military officers and tribal figures” (ibid.). Instead, the 
governmental officials tend to overlook the unsustainable agricultural practices. For instance, despite 
the Royal Water Committee calling through the National Water Strategy for a more sustainable 
agriculture (MWI, 2009: 5-2), the strategy is not implemented in this regard. In the interviews with 
senior governmental officials, unsustainable agricultural practices were always overlooked. 
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Moreover, the data on economic efficiency of the agricultural sector does not consider the whole 
agricultural chain, but only those directly working and the revenues of those directly employed in 
agriculture, and not of other industries tightly connected to agriculture. Nevertheless, for a UN 
official (interview 58) and for the leader of a local environmental NGO (interview 48), even 
considering the whole agricultural chain, which includes preparation of the land including seed 
supplies and fertilisers, land preparation including irrigation, production and processing, trading 
including transportation, this sector would reveal inefficiency, which is being ignored by state actors 
due to the influence of shadow actors (ISSP, 2012b: 12, Al-Jaloudy, 2006: 6). Also in the textbooks, 
the argument for the unsustainable agriculture water use is supported. In the geography textbook for 
grade ten, the inefficiency in agriculture is emphasised providing the data of its impact on GDP, 
2,1% in 2003, and the contribution of the labour force, 6,1% (Ministry of Education, 2013: 47; 
Hussein, 2017b). A former minister of the MWI during an interview mentioned that farming is part 
of the Jordanian culture and society: “if a person loves its land, this person will irrigate it and love it; 
it is not about numbers” (interview 63). According to him, it is not about 60% of the water resources 
for agriculture, as “even if Jordanians drunk it instead of using it for irrigation, they would still not 
have a balance, so there is a need for new water supply.” In addition, for the former minister, this 
sector does not employ only 3-4% of population, as “almost everyone in Jordan is a farmer, or has at 
least a farmers’ mentality” (interview 63). Therefore, for him they do not need to be employed to be 
farmers, but simply have a “farmers’ mentality.”  
The second aspect identifies the unsustainable and unfair water use as due to the Jordanian 
export of agricultural products. Donors and international organisations argue that Jordan should be 
careful in producing agricultural goods for export because of its limited water resources, and it 
should focus on low water intensive products and with a high economic return (ISSP, 2012b: 28). 
Even if unsustainable, they argue that both the crops and the destination of export need to be 
considered when calculating the economic impact of virtual water export. For instance, Eastern 
Europe provides the highest economic value for Jordanian vegetables (ISSP, 2012b: 28). However, 
most of the export stays into the region, with 53% to neighbouring countries, 40% to the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) members’ states, and only 7% to the rest of the world (ISSP, 2012a: 4). 
“The main reason behind this result is that tomatoes [, for instance,] are mostly exported when there 
is excess supply for the local market in peak season when prices are at their lowest” (ibid.: 5). In this 
way, the neighbouring countries absorb what the Jordanian market cannot consume, even if it has a 
lower value compared to the European one (ibid.). Donors, international organisations, and some 
academics call the relevant ministries and farmers to take into consideration water and economic 
value when deciding where and what to grow, and what to export (interviews 28, 45, 58, and 59). As 
Al Karablieh and Jabarin from the University of Jordan found in a recent study, “Jordan utilizes large 
amounts of water in its exports, and in turn, it does not export goods with low water requirements 
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[…]. Therefore, they have to be replaced with either imports or crops that optimize the water 
resources” (Al-Karablieh et al., 2011: 964). For Talozi, Al Sakaji, and Altz-Stamm, “it is additionally 
necessary to view the virtual water usage numbers in light of how much is being put towards produce 
that is exported from Jordan. […] This raises the policy question of whether Jordan should be 
producing this quantity of fruits and vegetables, either for export or for its own use, with precious 
blue water resources that are needed in other sectors” (Talozi et al., 2015: 477). It is important to 
highlight the “blue” water – freshwater: surface or groundwater - as opposed to “grey water” – 
polluted water or wastewater that can be treated and reused – and “green water” – soil moisture from 
precipitation.  Blue water is the important aspect, as some agriculture in Jordan is using “grey” water 
and that use is not as problematic for exportation, while exporting “blue” water is problematic and 
unsustainable for Jordan. More specifically, treated wastewater in agriculture is mainly used in the 
Jordan Valley, making food export from there less problematic than from the Highlands, where 
farmers only use “blue” water for irrigation.  
While donors, international organisations, and critical academics emphasise this aspect, the 
senior governmental officials de-emphasise it. In an interview at the MoA, it was noted by a senior 
director that while there are policies and recommended crops to be planted in the agricultural sector 
in Jordan, for instance to disengage from tomatoes, bananas, and water intensive crops, in practice 
they are difficult to implement as there are no economic incentives to help the farmers to shift 
towards other products (interview 25). Indeed, the major factor for all farmers – shadow actors and 
others – is that the economic incentives simply are not there and the government has not provided 
any vision or framework within which farmers can create the needed secondary industries to help 
them export the more appropriate crops. In this interview, this director at the MoA explains that it is 
not easy for the MoA to intervene on the agricultural sector dictating what to cultivate and what not 
to grow, especially given that economic incentives are not provided to farmers to comply with the 
regulations. In addition, pressures from the shadow actors make it difficult for the MoA to take 
decisions against or constraining farmers’ decisions and choices, to try to reduce water for agriculture 
or to convince farmers to shift to new crops. Moreover, most employees at the ministry are farmers, 
the minister himself is a farmer, and they are all supported by the farmers’ community. As most 
Jordanians are originally farmers, for the director of MoA, a strength of agriculture is that it involves 
the vast majority of the population. For the director, consideration linked to the broader socio-
political-economic context, from the historical background to the cultural importance of farming, are 
to be considered when taking decisions and passing policies. For him, this would be also be linked to 
domestic concerns, and to the social stability of the country. 
Texts sources of this aspect are reports of donors and international organisations  (interviews 
28, 45, 58, and 59), and a few academic articles of critical academics (Al-Karablieh et al., 2011, 
ISSP, 2012b). However, governmental officials overlook this aspect. The argument of unsustainable 
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agricultural water use is strongly supported by the concept of virtual water – water used to produce 
any product or service - , which argues that water scarce countries like Jordan should save their water 
resources by relying on import of food and reducing their water allocation to the agricultural sector 
(Allan, 2002: 165-167). However, this idea is challenged by the discourse of food sovereignty, as 
some local NGOs like the Arab Group for the Protection of Nature (APN) as well as governmental 
officials, claim that this could lead Jordan to further decrease its food sovereignty, becoming further 
dependent on foreign countries outside the region even for food. Therefore, they are calling for 
strengthening the cooperation among the Arab countries to reach food self-sufficiency not at the 
country level but at the regional level (APN website, interview 72). The necessity for a regional food 
sovereignty was underlined by the Jordanian minister of the MoE Taher Shakhshir at the Arab Forum 
for Environment and Development’s (AFED) conference in November 2014 and by the AFED report 
(Namrouqa, 2013b, Namrouqa, 2014b). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This article has revealed the influence of shadow actors in Jordan’s water politics. It has shown that 
shadow actors have nothing to do with searching for solutions advantageous for them, but rather they 
just want to use their water without interference, and to maintain the privileges and benefit they are 
benefiting from. This article shows that monarchy depends for security on informal social structures, 
which tie military and civilian elites (individuals and their followers) into “network of support”, and 
on “social contract” with the people. “Patronage”, funded by the “rentier state”, underpins the 
system, with privileges and benefits – including access to cheap water – exchanged for allegiance to 
the country. The evolving “political bargain”, changing shape and expanding according to key 
political and economic developments (importantly, 1950s, 1980s, 1989, and 2005, 2011) based on a 
system of economic benefits, rewards and privileges, permitted powerful individuals, sometime 
working in groups, to influence policy choices, control the economy and allocation of resources, and 
resist reforms in the national interest. A general consensus emerges from the findings of previous 
researches that as a result of the evolving organisation of power on which Hashemite rule is based, 
governance in general and the water challenges in particular, cannot be remedied only through 
improved management and technical solutions political reforms are required to replace the influence 
of the “shadow state” networks with an inclusive political system ensuring transparent and 
accountable government (among others, see: Muasher, 2011; Richards, 1993; Greenwood, 2003, 
Peters and Moore, 2009, Yorke, 1988, 1990, 2013; 2016).  
Consequently, concerning solutions for the water sector and for water scarcity, the MWI 
leadership are technically experienced, well informed, and politically savvy and aware – they have a 
short, medium, and long-term views. To solve the water crisis - for the MWI - Jordan will require 
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improved transboundary cooperation, new sources of bulk supply long term. Demand restraint can 
postpone the resort of these more expensive supplies. For the MWI, a mix of solutions will therefore 
be required, including regional cooperation, demand restraint, agricultural reforms, wastewater 
expansion, and diversification of the economy. By analysing the water crisis in these terms, it is 
understandable why the MWI and other governmental water experts in the kingdom tend to draw the 
attention on how to increase the supply – mainly through regional solutions, transboundary 
agreements; meanwhile the donors and international organisations draw attention to urgent need for 
demand restraint and cross sector prioritisation of water issues.  
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